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In his refusal of the Master’s order, Bartleby does not negate the 
predicate; rather, he affirms a non-predicate: he does not say that he 
doesn’t want to do it; he says that he prefers (wants) not to do it. This 
is how we pass from the politics of “resistance” or “protestation,” 
which parasitizes upon what it negates, to a politics which opens up a 
new space outside the hegemonic position and its negation.  
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View1 
 
The small city of Minamata, located in the southern island of Kyushu in the Japanese 
archipelago, is known for an industrial disease named after that city. Minamata disease is caused 
by the ingestion of methyl mercury that was released for more than three decades, beginning in 
1937, from a factory owned by the Chisso Corporation. Mercury flowed into the Shiranui Sea, 
where it accumulated in, and eventually damaged or destroyed, the natural environment, 
including fish and sea shells, as well as human bodies. If mercury enters the human body and 
accumulates to a sufficient degree, it affects the nervous system, paralyzing the tongue, fingers, 
and legs, until one eventually loses control over one’s whole body, leading to death. Children are 
especially vulnerable to the effects of mercury. In the short period between 1955 and 1959, more 
than 200 prenatally exposed infants in Minamata, where contained 8,584 houses,2 were born with 
the disease.3 Nonetheless, the relations between victims’ symptoms and the chemicals released 
by the Chisso Corporation went unrecognized for decades, until 1968 when the Minister of 
Welfare finally admitted that the disease was caused by methyl mercury released from the Chisso 
factory. 
This tragic situation poses a challenge and a task for ethicists grappling with irremediable 
experiences of violence, such as injuries of the sort caused by irresponsible chemical disposal. 
How might ethicists approach situations where victims are dying in extreme agony, their bodies 
out of control, or where babies have experienced prenatal exposure to poison? How to respond 
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when those suffering from the disease have no means to make a living beyond fishing in the 
contaminated waters? And what is the right course of action when those afflicted by the disease 
are themselves accused of destroying Minamata’s commercial culture by attributing their disease 
to the practices of the Chisso factory, the city’s economic foundation? The incurable Minamata 
disease, caused by exposure to methyl mercury used to produce the raw material for plastic, is a 
product of industrialization and modernization. Given these economic, environmental, and 
sociocultural complexities, what responses are available when traditional ethical, spiritual, and 
legal responses based on the notion of “justice” are themselves implicated in, and even complicit 
with, the very structures that have given rise to the suffering? 
In this paper, I want to adumbrate an ethical response toward encountering and 
responding to violence done to others under modern industrial conditions. In doing so, I draw 
upon the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who tests the limits of ethical theories in 
pursuing a reformulation of ethics in the face of the unprecedented catastrophic events at 
Auschwitz. The horrors of Auschwitz are, on the one hand, unique and incommensurable with 
other historical tragedies. And yet, one may extrapolate from Agamben’s ethical thinking of 
Auschwitz in developing an approach to the Minamata disaster.4  
Extending Agamben’s inquiry into the possibilities of ethical responses to irrevocable 
harm, I focus on Minamata patient Ogata Masato’s thought and practice, for they embody the 
approach theorized by Agamben, enacting an ethic that, as we will see, is not “beyond good and 
evil but rather….before” good and evil.5 I will suggest that Ogata’s practice of carving 
bodhisattva Jizo statues and placing them on Minamata’s reclaimed land manifests a new ethical 
element, as Agamben puts it, and thereby assists us in formulating an ethical response to 
violence.  N
um
ata
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Agamben on Ethics and Law 
 In his book Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben urges readers not to conflate the categories 
of ethics and law. His warning against dependency on law as a moral authority derives from 
concern for the irrevocable harm done to victims at Auschwitz. Agamben cites Italian jurist 
Sebastiano Satta, who claims that “judgment is itself punishment” and “the only truly innocent 
person ‘is not the one who is acquitted, but rather the one who goes through life without 
judgment.’”6 According to Agamben, the quaestio facti, or question or matter of fact, needs to be 
separated from, and must not be reduced to, the quaestio juris, the question or matter of the law. 
He therefore clarifies what he takes to be the proper domain of the law: “law,” he writes, “is not 
directed toward the establishment of justice. Nor is it directed toward the verification of truth. 
Law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of truth and justice.”7 “The ultimate aim of 
law,” according to Agamben, is “the production of a res judicata, in which the sentence becomes 
the substitute for the true and the just, being held as true despite its falsity and injustice.”8 
 Agamben’s separation of law from justice is provocative. But if damage done by violence 
is truly irrevocable and irremediable, such as is the case with damage to a human’s mind or body, 
then restorative justice is impossible. In this way, corporeal and emotional damages are 
fundamentally different from, say, damage done to a fence by a reckless driver. Under the law, 
you might acquire a new, sturdier fence. But when the damage is irrevocable and the damaged 
thing irreplaceable, so-called justice only amounts to the best possible, but always inadequate, 
response—incarceration of the perpetrator, monetary compensation, and the like. It is precisely 
for this reason that Agamben seeks to maintain a separation of justice from the law. “[T]he 
ultimate end of the juridical regulation,” claims Agamben, “is to produce judgment; but 
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
4 
 
judgment aims neither to punish nor to extol, neither to establish justice nor to prove the truth. 
Judgment is in itself the end.”9 
 It is worth noting, however, that, having divorced law from justice, Agamben is not 
claiming that the law is irrelevant to the imputation of guilt and assumption of responsibility. In 
fact, he believes that we should treat guilt and responsibility not on the terrain of ethics, but that 
of law: “To assume guilt and responsibility—which can, at times, be necessary—is to leave the 
territory of ethics and enter that of law,” he writes.10 Agamben illustrates his point by reference 
to the case of Adolf Eichmann at the Jerusalem trial, where Eichmann admitted his guilt before 
God, yet sought to refuse legal prosecution. “It must be recalled,” writes Agamben, “that the 
assumption of moral responsibility has value only if one is ready to assume the relevant legal 
consequences.”11  
 So what is the relation, for Agamben, between moral responsibility and ethics? Ethics, by 
his account, is about neither guilt nor responsibility, which are the purview of the law. Agamben 
thus departs from traditional understandings of ethics as the “doctrine of the happy life,” which 
includes systems for implementing restorative and distributive justice.12 But in the case of 
Auschwitz and other instances of irrevocable damage, where such justice is impossible, ethical 
thought reaches its limit, and thus compels the admission of our incapacity to assert restorative 
justice or assume responsibility.13 Ethics only articulates “zones of non-responsibility,”14 by 
confronting us with the enormity of responsibility that exceeds our ability to assume it. “At the 
most,” writes Agamben, “we can be faithful to it, that is, assert its unassumability.”15  
Instead of seeking an alternative in the realm of ethics, that is, a zone of non-
responsibility, Agamben turns to Primo Levi’s writings in an attempt to find a “new ethical 
element” that might contribute to ethics after Auschwitz. This new ethical element is situated in N
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what Levi calls the “gray zone”—not a zone of non-responsibility, but a “zone of 
irresponsibility”16 in which the boundaries between victims and victimizers collapses, and the 
distinctions between good and evil are rendered meaningless, with judgment thereby being 
impossible (“impotentia judicandi”).17 Following Levi’s line of thought, our modern industrial 
society normalizes the violence we inflict upon ourselves and the environment by systemizing or 
institutionalizing this harm. Industrial diseases thereby bring into question any clear boundaries 
between victims and victimizers, the innocent and the guilty; Chisso factory workers are often 
victims of Minamata disease, for example, while consumers purchase plastic commodities, 
contributing to the perpetuation of the industrial disease. That all of us who participate in modern, 
industrialized ways of life are complicit in this violence, we come to recognize the impasse of 
ethics that concerns Agamben. 
Ogata Masato: Responsibility and Atonement  
 Agamben’s theoretical framework may be applied to the Minamata case, through an 
examination of Ogata Masato’s philosophy, religiosity, and practices. Ogata’s example will be 
illuminating, for not only was he skeptical and critical of the formal legal processes and their 
consequences; he also came to see himself as implicated in the system that still sustains the 
Chisso corporation.  
Ogata Masato was born in a small fishing village called Meshima, Ashikita-cho, located 
north of Minamata city in 1953.18 Having lost his fisherman father to the Minamata disease, and 
himself suffering from the disease, he joined a patients’ group taking an action against the Chisso 
Corporation. Though he initially devoted himself fully to the movement, Ogata withdrew rather 
abruptly. Several factors precipitated his break from the group. For example, as the movement 
and its supporters grew, and legal procedures were undertaken, the movement “shift[ed] from the N
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streets to the court.”19 The result, by Ogata’s reckoning, was that the individual patient’s 
suffering was depersonalized, since law and legal procedures aim at a form of justice founded on 
objectivity, impartiality, and therefore impersonal relations. 
Frustrated that he was never able to “meet” the actual people making decisions at 
Chisso, rather than merely confronting representatives of the abstract corporate entity in court, 
Ogata began to question the merit of the judiciary. Its focus seemed to him to be placed on 
monetary compensation, rather than establishing and fostering human relations. As Ogata writes: 
I began to have doubts. If I wasn’t in the movement for money, 
was I in it to avenge my father’s death? What would happen after I 
had realized that revenge? Was it just an illusion to entertain the 
thought that I was putting the interest of others above my own? 
How could I pretend to be altruistic when I was making my own 
family suffer? Did the end justify the means?20 
 
Adding to Ogata’s inner struggle was the fact that the patient’s movement itself became more 
and more bureaucratic and faceless, further resembling the modern and industrial entities he was 
fighting. 
 Unable to bear the weight of these issues and what he took to be the deterioration of the 
movement, Ogata decided to remove himself from it, thereby forfeiting his compensation money 
from Chisso. He describes his resignation and his discomfort with the court: “It seemed that no 
one wanted to address the more important issues. But the problem was that not even I could 
clearly identify those issues.”21 He would, however, come to identify two main problems. The 
first is the question of responsibility. With regard to Minamata disease, the Chisso Corporation is 
certainly culpable, having released methyl mercury for a period of nearly three decades, while 
the prefectural and central governments, aware of Chisso’s actions, protected the corporation in 
the interest of Minamata’s economic prosperity. Ogata suspected that the so-called responsibility 
assigned to Chisso and the government entities under the law failed to address the deeper issues 
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of individual human responsibility, environmental degradation, and the spiritual disposition of all 
those involved—victims and victimizers. In other words, the Minamata disease, Ogata believed, 
raises spiritual issues—what he calls tamashii—that cannot be addressed in court.22 Ogata 
eventually reaches a conclusion resonant with Agamben’s, claiming that “the idea of assuming 
responsibility is an illusion. Our legal proceedings are premised on this illusion.”23 
 Second, Ogata imagined what he would have done were he to have been in the position 
of a worker or executive at Chisso when the factory was economically thriving. Becoming a 
whistleblower would have meant being fired, and therefore deprived of job prospects in 
Minamata, where the economy was heavily dependent upon the company.24 Further, he would 
have been shunned, and most likely his family would have been socially ostracized.25 Imagining 
such circumstances, Ogata failed to find in himself the moral courage to face the social 
repercussions of whistleblowing.26 It was at this point that he recognized that he himself was one 
of them: “I was also a Chisso,” he says.   
For the past forty years [Ogata writes,] I owned a car to drive, a 
TV set, refrigerator, and a plastic-based fishing boat. In other 
words, I am surrounded by so many things made at chemical 
factories like Chisso. For example, most of the vinyl chloride used 
for the faucets at home was made at Chisso, or more recent 
example of Chisso product is liquid crystal, used for the computer 
and TV screens. We live surrounded by Chisso products. If we talk 
only about the Minamata incident, the Chisso Corporation is 
responsible for it, but in this present time, we all have already 
become “another Chisso.”27  
 
Under the conditions of modern industrialized society—whether one is aware of them or not, and 
whether directly or indirectly—even a victim of Chisso also supports and is complicit with 
Chisso, the very entity that destroyed the victim’s health, the lives of loved ones, and the 
community at large. “From the perspective of the [victims’] movement,” Ogata remarks, “Chisso Nu
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is the Other, the enemy, the assailant. For me, however, this viewpoint evolved until I recognized 
‘The Chisso within.’”28 
Recognizing that he was a victim harboring the victimizer within, Ogata finds himself in 
a zone where the ethical resources for sorting out one’s moral culpability are quickly exhausted. 
Ogata writes, “The idea of assuming responsibility is an illusion. Our legal proceedings are 
premised on this illusion. We make the assumption that if we pay reparations, we have assumed 
responsibility.”29 
It is from this insight that Ogata’s spiritual practice emerges. Forming the Hongan no 
kai—a coalition of the “Original Vow”—in 1994, Ogata and other members, though avoiding 
strict conformity to dogmatic religious teachings and traditional structures, developed a practice 
of carving bodhisattva Jizō figures. Ogata and his friends began to shape statues called nobotoke, 
placing them on the reclaimed land of Minamata Bay, where clean-up efforts had consolidated 
and buried toxic mercury beneath the soil. For Ogata, this land “is a place of atonement [wabi o 
ireru basho]. It is a place to contemplate my own guilt and to offer my own apology.”30  
Ogata’s words and actions—carving and placing bodhisattva statues on the site of his 
guilt as a sign of apology—are inexplicable within traditional frameworks of good and evil, 
victims and victimizers. But far from a simple withdrawal from the real world, Ogata’s practice 
involves a principled refusal to participate in the legal and economic systems that are themselves 
constitutive of the problem. Even as Hongan no kai distinguishes itself from religious 
organizations, its adaptation of the Jizo image—standing on this land where one seeks self-
reflection, atonement, and reconciliation, and where the living encounter the dead—draws upon 
spiritual resources in Pure Land Buddhism and local animistic beliefs. Jizo is a popular 
bodhisattva in folkloric narratives among Japanese people. Taking over the role of Dōsoshin, or N
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Sai no kami, a deity who guides passage through liminal spaces between villages, Jizo is widely 
known as a mediator between two realms—the dead and the living, adult and child, this world 
and the world beyond. In the folkloric imagination, Jizo undermines the clear distinctions 
upholding social, legal, and ethical structures. 
Hongan no Kai’s practice of situating Jizo statues on the reclaimed land of the Minamata 
Bay similarly eschews traditional ethical frameworks and religious dogmas underwriting social 
and juridical systems that dichotomize victims and victimizers. The term Hongan is usually 
associated with Amida Buddha’s “Original Vow” to save the unenlightened. Although the group 
adapts language, imagery, and rituals from Pure Land Buddhism, it also avoids the kind of 
systematic frameworks offered or imposed by established religions. Ogata explains that the 
group does not aspire to be a religious organization; rather, “we would like to deepen the idea of 
‘inochi no negai’ or ‘vow for life.’”31 Thus the inclusion of the term Hongan in the 
organization’s name does not represent allegiance to a particular Buddhist institution, but rather a 
dedication to protect all of life.  
Hagihara Shūko, a scholar of religion who examines ethical responses from Minamata 
patients, explains that the Hongan no kai group “does not have a consensus on the definitions of 
such common terms as ‘soul,’ ‘life,’ or ‘prayer,’ but on the contrary, each member continues to 
ask him- or herself incessantly what these words mean.”32 The conscious refusal to fix 
definitions is one facet of Ogata’s investigation into alternatives to the system that governs and 
regulates our lives by concealing our subjectivity, and thereby depersonalizing human relations. 
What Ogata aims at instead is the restoration of humanity—the personal agent resisting a system 
that de-personalizes individuals and their relations to each other. The restored, personal humanity, 
however, is not keyed to atomistic individualism, but rather oriented toward realization of radical N
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interdependence that extends to others, including Chisso workers, fish in the Shiranui Sea, and 
even the deceased. The recognition of radical interdependency coincides with Buddhist ontology, 
and its recognition of the independent self as an illusion. Yet the members of Hongan no kai, by 
distancing themselves from existing religious institutions and their dogmas, reveal what religious 
and legal institutions do not. For whereas responsibility presupposes the illusion of an 
independent, autonomous, and discrete individual within a framework of good and evil, the 
practice of the Hongan no kai arises with a recognition of radical interdependence before all 
good and evil. This is the “grey” zone of “irresponsibility.” 
What is left to us, then, as Ogata and Hongan no kai show, is this sensibility of wabi. 
Translated as “atonement” in the English edition of his autobiography, wabi is a multifaceted 
term connoting apology, repentance, and penitence. When Ogata uses the term wabi, it not only 
refers to wabi for the Minamata disease, but for the destruction of the natural resources of 
Minamata by industrialized civilization, which Ogata calls “man’s ‘original sin [genzai].’”33 “If 
Minamata Bay and its [reclaimed land] symbolize the depth of human sin,” continues Ogata, 
“then this ought also to be a place where humans can acknowledge their sin, atone for it, and 
pray.”34 Thus, wabi conveys the recognition of the need for self-reflection and reconciliation. 
The reconciliation within wabi, or atonement, is not, however, of the sort that traditional 
ethics can prescribe or conventional legal procedures advocate. Rather, it is beyond such worldly 
systems; it involves a recognition and realization of the “at-one-ness” of life, and the spiritual 
dispositions that correspond to that realization. Although Ogata acknowledges that carving and 
placing the bodhisattva statues in Minamata is a “highly personal act,” “at-one-ness” is embodied 
in these stone statues, because they “will also serve as intermediaries through whom we may 
communicate with the souls of the deceased. A reunification of the living and dead is our N
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greatest wish, our most fervent prayer.”35 This sensibility of “at-one-ness” is therefore not an 
appeal to individual responsibility, but a realization of irresponsibility expressed as a 
supplication beyond and before ethics and law. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, for Agamben, justice is not fully realized in the law. Instead, he 
clarifies the limits of law in the face of irrevocable violence, arguing that “once law has 
produced its res judicata, it cannot go any further.”36 Without denying the necessity for 
judgments based in law, he calls for a practice beyond jurisdiction, and thus implores readers to 
move beyond but also before law and ethics. Like Primo Levi, who bears witness to the plight of 
the Auschwitz victims, Minamata patient Ogata Masato experiences the limit of law and ethics, 
bearing witness to the victims of the Minamata disease. His thoughts and actions likewise call for 
us to reevaluate legal and ethical systems founded upon the illusion of the assumption of 
responsibility. Without abandoning a functioning legal system, we must soberly admit our 
inability to assume the infinite responsibility that comes with irreparable damage. The 
emergence of a new ethical element in our time will begin with the realization of an atonement, 
an at-one-ness beyond all responsibility. 
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